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Summary
This paper develops a model for Namibian hake, whIch
ineorporates the biology, gear seleetivity and the
eeonomies of the hake fisheries in a framework that
aUows the analysis of fishing gear impaets on the potential
economIc gains from the resouree. The objeetive is to
produce quantitative results on the key variables of the
fishery, namely eeonomIc rent, standing biomass and
cateh levels, that wil support the optimal sustainable
management of one of Namibia's most valuable fishery
resources. Outeomes for three management scenarios are
produced, (i) command; (ii) cooperative; and (ii) non-
eooperative. For each of these, results are presented for
two different assumptions of the eeonomie setting under
which the managers of the fishery operate, that is, a fuUy
economIc setting and a setting with eost-less labor inputs.
As would be expected, different management scenarios
and assumptions about the economic setting impact on
the results derived from the model in signifieant ways.
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Introduction
The objective of this study is to undertake bioeconomic analysis of Namibia's hake
fishery to support optimal sustainable management. The management of Nambian hake
consists of two main processes. First, a process of determning the annual total allowable
catch (TAC), and second, a process that allocates the T AC among a number of license
holders who employ different fishing gears to exploit hake. These two steps are cared
out by the Ministry of Fisheries and Marne Resources, Nambia (MFMR), us ing inputs
from scientists, industry and management. It is anticipated that the results of this study
wil provide insights that would help enhance the work of the MFMR with respect to both
the determnation and allocation of the T AC for hake.
The study focuses sharlyon three important characteristics of the hake fisheries. One,
the fact that wetfish and freezer trawlers, the two main vessel types used to exploit the
resource, have different fishing grounds and consequently target upon different age
groups of the hake stock. Two, the fact that the two vessels land hake in forms that
influence the price they receive per unit weight of their catch. Three, each vessel group
has its own co st structure, and hence land hake at different costs per unit weight.
The work in this paper fits into the generalliterature on the economics of shared stocks
(see for instance, Munro 1979, Levhar and Mirman 1980, Fischer and Mirman 1992,
Sumaila 1997a,b, and Arstrong 1998). Sumaila (1997a) is a study of the North-East
Atlantic cod in the Barents Sea. This is a fishery located in the Northern hemisphere,
which has been very well studied. On the other hand, the present paper studies the
N ambian hake fishery, which is based in the less developed South. This fishery has not
been well studied, especially with respect to bioeconomic analysis, and therefore serves
as a greater challenge to the modeIer.
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For instance, while there are many studies that look into the selectivity patterns of the
coastal and trawler vessels active in the Barents Sea (see for example, Arstrong et aL.,
1991 and Larsen and Isaksen, 1993) there is hardly any that has looked c10sely at the
selectivity patterns of the wetfish and freezer trawlers active in Nambia's EEZ. In
comparison to Sumaila (1997b), this paper is more ambitious because it incorporates
stock recruitment and dynamcs, and seeks to advice not only on how much of a
predeterrned T AC should be allocated to the two vessel groups (as was the objective in
Sumaila, 1997b) but also on the overall size of the TAC. To my knowledge this work is
the first computational game theoretic model developed and applied to a fishery in sub-
Saharan Mrica.
In the next section, I briefly discuss the hake fishery. Section 3 presents the bioeconornc
model, inc1uding the data used for the computations. The numerical results of the study
are presented in section 4. One key finding is that a management strategy for hake that
seeks to protect either the juvenile or mature par of the stock from exploitation make
good economic sense. This results may indeed be one explanation for the recent surprise
dec1ine in Namibian hake stocks, which followed the introduction of a policy of 60:40
share of the hake T AC to the wetfish and freezer fleets, respectively. Finally, section 5
surnarses the main results, and conc1udes the paper.
The Namibian hake fishery
The hake stocks are one of the three most important fish species of the highly productive
Namibian EEZ. The others are horse mackerel and pi1chard. The main reason for the high
productivity of the Nambian EEZ is the Benguela upwelling system prevalent in the
coastal zone of Namibia and other Southem African countres.
Arong the species of hakes inhabiting the Nambian EEZ, that is, Merluccius capensis
(also known as cape hake), Merluccius paradoxus (deep-water hake) and Merluccius
pollis, only the former two are of major importance to the fishery. These two species are
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so identical in appearance that they are of ten treated as one and the same (Wysokinski,
1986). Both species are relatively long-lived, reaching ages of up to and over 9 years.
Hakes are usually found dose to the bottom of the water during day-time but rise to
intermediate water during night time, probably following their prey.
Hake catches reached a maximum of over 800 000 tons in 1972, averaging some 600 000
tons annually during the period from the late 1960's to mid 1970's. As expected these
period of high catches was followed by lean years, with average catches of less than 200
000 tons from the mid 1970's to 1980. This, however, rose again and remained relatively
stable between 300 - 400 000 tons for most of the 80's. It is stated in Hamukuaya (1994)
that during those years of high catches there was a large proportion of young fish between
the ages of 2 - 3 years old, probably accounting for the low catches in later years. Bonfi
et aL. (1998), shows that due to the high catches of hake, horse mackerel and pi1chard
attributable to the activities of distant water fleets prior to independence, Namibia
inherited a fishery well below its productive potential.
It is worth mentioning that the fishing sec tor is an important par of the economy of
Nambia, with the hake fisheries bein g an important par of this. According to the MFMR
hake contributed about N$230 millon or 7.4% of Nambia's estimated exports in 1994.
The model
The fishing fleets targeting hake
A varety of fishing vessels are used to harvest hake; differing in their gross registered
tonnage (GRT), engine horse power (HP), processing equipment, and freezing capacity.
However, the bulk of hake are landed by wetfish and freezer trawlers. For instance, in
1994 out of a total of 108 213 tons of hake landed, 99 152 tons were by wetfish and
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freezer trawlers. This is well over 90% of the totallandings of hake that year. The rest is
landed using monksole trawlers, longliners, and mid-water trawlers (see Moorsom, 1994
and Sumaila, 1997b). 1995 and 96 data show that the dominance of the bottom trawlers
in the hake fisheries continuous unabated (Ministry of Fisheries and Marne Resources,
1996). As a result of the overwhelming dominance of the bottom trawlers in the demersal
hake fishery, I focus my attention on these vessels and organise the wetfish and freezer
trawlers into two separate and distinct entities assumed to be managed by two different
bodies, from now on, to be known as Wetfish Industry Group (w) and Freezer Industry
Group (t), respectively.l These two groups are assumed to interact under (i) command, (ii)
cooperative and (iii) noncooperative environments, as explained later in the paper.
Recruitment and stock dynamics of Namibian hake
The Beverton Holt age-structured model forms the basis for modeling the biology ofhake
in this study. According to Punt (1988) this model corresponds closely to the stock
biomass observed in ICSEAF Divisions 1.3 and 1.4 (which lie in the Namibian EEZ)
from 1956 to 1985, the parameters of the model having been estimated using results of
virtual population analysis.
Let the spawning biomass, B:, be defined by the following equation:
l.
arnax
Bf = ¿Pa wana,t
a=O
where a=O,I,.. .,amax, denotes age group a hake; ama is the last age group; wa stands for
weight of hake of age a at the star of the year; t=1,2,...,T, is fishing years, with T
denoting the last period, Pa stands for the proportion of age a hake that is mature, and na,t
represents the number of age a hake in year t.
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The stock-recruit relationship, Ri, is given by:
2.
aBS
Ri = no,i = ( t )-r
aß + B:
where no,i is the number of recruits in year t; and a,ß,y are parameters of the extended
Beverton Holt stock-recruit relationship (Punt, 1988).
From the above, the basic stock biomass can be represented by the equations below:
3.
na t = Ola-1 t-l - ha t' for O c: a c: A, , ,
nA t = OlA t - OlA-1 t-l -hA t' na O given, , , "
The function ha,i = L q p,ana,iei denotes the total hare st by both players of age group a
p
hake in fishing period t; Ois the age independent natural survival rate; ei is the fishing
effort exerted on cod in period t, while q stands for the catchabilty coefficient of the
hake harvesting vessels. The reader should note that the stock dynamcs of the last age
group of hake is given special treatment. This is meant to capture the fact that all age ama
hake do not die at the end of a given period.
On selectivity and catchabilty
To determine the appropriate catchabilty coeffcients to apply in the model, I employ the
method outlined in Appendix 1 of Sumaila (1997a). A key input to the method is gear
selectivitf. For a well-studied fishery such as the Barents Sea cod fishery, it is easy to
find these from the literature, this is not the case for the Namibian hake fishery.
Therefore, to form an opinion on the selectivity pattems of w and f, I interviewed a
number of fisheries people in Nambia (see acknowledgment). A clear consensus that
came out of the interviews was that the wetfish trawlers (because their fishing grounds
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are dose to the shore) target mainly young fish while the freezer trawlers target mainly
matue fish, because they operate further into the sea. U sing this background information,
I decided to assume in the model that wetfish trawlers exploit age groups 1 to 6 hake,
whi1e freezer trawlers target age groups 5 to 93. The selectivity pattem for hake reported
in Punt and Butterworth (1991) is used to set a total overall selectivity for each age group.
Hence, the sum of the selectivity by the two vessel groups on a given age group is equal
to the selectivity for that age group reported in Punt and Butterworth (op.cit).
Economics of the hake fisheries
As mentioned earlier, the MFMR is assumed to manage the hake stock for the benefit of
Nambia as a whole. It therefore acts as a sole owner who seeks to obtain maximum
economic benefits from the resource without destroying the resource base. We determne
an equilibrium outcome which I term the "command outcome" to depict the behaviour
and actions of the MFMR. In this outcome, the MFMR decides both the T AC and its
allocation to the two paries, in a manner which wil ensure maximum total econornc
benefit from hake. Two other equilbrium outcomes to be computed are the
noncooperative and cooperative. The former is determned to serve as a benchmark for
comparson with the cooperative and command outcomes. In addition, it serves as the
"threat point" when the Nash cooperative solution is determned (see Nash, 1953, Munro,
1979).
For two reasons, it is assumed in this paper that the price per unit weight of hake faced by
both players are perfectly elastic. The first relates to the fact that Nambian supply of
hake is not big enough to influence the international market for hake under normal
circumstances. Secondly, the focus here is on the impacts of gear selectivity stemmng
from interactions atthe level of the stock, not at the level of the market.
The hare st cost function of a given player p in period t, C(p, t), is modeled as an "almost"
linear function ofits fishing effort, ep,t (see Sumaila, 1995r
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5.
k el + b
c( ) p p,te p,1 = 1 + b
where b = 0.01, and kp/(1+b) ~ kp is the cost of engaging one fishing fleet for one year.
Let the single period profit of player p be given by:
6.
A
ffp,i = ffp(npep,i) = VaL Waap.ana,iep,i - C(ep,i)
a=O
where na, t is the age- and period-dependent stock size in number of fish; wa is the mean
weight of fish of age a; and ap,a is the age and player dependent catchabilty coefficient,
that is, the share of age group a hake being caught by one unit of fishing effort of player
p.
The noncooperative scenario
Under this scenario it is assumed that there is no regulator coordinating the actions of the
two fleets. Furthermore, there is no possibility for credible communication between w
and f - the management of each fleet takes the actions of the other as given, and chooses
its own strategies to maximize own discounted economic rent. That is, each player finds a
sequence of effort leveIs, ep,i' so as to maximize its discounted economic rent:
7.
T
Mp(n,ep) = L£5~ffAnl,ep,l)
t=1
subject to the stock dynamics given by equations (2) and (3) above and the obvious
nonnegativity constraints. In the equation above, £5 p = (1 + rp ) -1 is the discount factor.
The varable n (nt) is the post-catch stock matrix (vector) in number of fish; and rp
denotes the interest rate of player p.
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The command scenario
Here, the commander (or regulator), which in this paricular case is the MFR, seeks to
tind a sequence of effort, ep" and stock leveIs, na" to maximise a weighted average of the
objective functionals of the two fleets denoted Profcom' fl and (1- fl) indicate how much
weight is given to the own objective functional of w andfby the commander. For a given
fl 6/0,1), the cooperative management objective functional translates into maximise:
8.
Pr ofcom = ßvI (n, ei) + (1- ß)Mi (n, ei)
subject to the same constraints expressed by equations (2) and (3). The important point to
note here is that the MFMR chooses the fl which produces the highest total economic
rent. This then determnes both the overall T AC and how much of this should be
harested by w and f, respectively. After determning these, the MFMR simply issues a
directive, which we assume the tishers are under the obligation to comply with.
The cooperative scenario
Under this scenaro toa there is no commander, w and f work together freely and
cooperatively to determne a T AC and its allocation to themselves. The key point to note
at this junction is that the outcome agreed upon must be incentive compatible with their
own interests (see Binmore 1992). In other words, the outcome and hence the payoffs to
each player must be at least as much as what the player wil receive if he decides not to
cooperate.
The two players may choose to work for a cooperative "with" or "without" side payments
arangement. The latter refers to a situation in which all players want to paricipate in
actual fishing, and thus wil not accept any compensation not to do so. The former is the
opposite of this, all possible solutions are considered, inc1uding the possibility of buying
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out a player. Given the definition of the command scenaro in this paper, the solution to
the cooperative "with" side payments is dose to the "command" outcome. In both cases,
the objective is to maximise the weighted average of the objective functionals of the two
fleets under the appropriate constraints. The main difference between the two is in the
way the gain from cooperation is shared. In the case of the command scenaro, the
commander decides this, while under cooperative with side payments, a rule based on an
application of the Nash bargaining scheme (Nash 1953; Munro 1990) is used4.
The solutions to the model are pursued numerically (see Flåm, 1993), rather than
analytically for two reasons. First, the complex age-structured nature of the model makes
it analytically difficult to solve (see Conrad and Clark, 1989). Second, the objective of the
current paper is to produce quantitative rather than qualitative results.
Model data
The biologica1, economic and technological data are mostly taken from Punt and
Butterworth (1991), Punt (1988), Sumaila (1997b) and the MFMR. Table 1 displays (i)
the proportion mature of each age group, Pa' (ii) the average weight, wa, (iii) the total
selectivity for each age group, Sa' (iv) the initial numbers of each age group of fish, and
(v) the catchability coeffcients for each vessel tye. The latter are calculated by splitting
the total selectivity according to the observed targeting pattems of juvenile and mature
hake by the two vessels; and using the framework in Appendix 1 of Sumaila (1997a),
The rest of the model parameters are given the values: 0.=6300 (millon) ß = 0.16; y=1.0
(Punt 1988); ~ax= 9 Punt and Butterworth (1991). Natural survival rate, e, is assumed to
be 0.81 per year. Price per kilogram for the landings of the wetfish (v1=N$ 8.18) and
freezer (vi=N$ 7.38) trawlers are taken from Sumaila (1997b). The cost ofemploying the
wetfish and freezer trawlers for one year are determined from data from the Namibian
fishing industry to be N$12.29 and N$ 39.90 milion, respectively. A discount factor of
0.952 (equivalent to a real interest rate of 5%) is assumed.
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The results
Payoffs in a fuHy economic setting
By a fully economic setting I refer to a situation in which the fisheries manager
incorporates all the appropriate economic parameters and varables (prices, costs and
discount factors) into the decision-making process on how to manage the resource.
Figue 1 displays graphically the discounted economic rent achievable under cooperation
for different ß-values. This graph shows how the payoffs obtained by using wetfish and
freezer trawlers change with varing ß-values, that is, with changing emphasis on the
preferences of the wetfish fleet relative to those of the freezers.
The best discounted economic rent computed under the command, noncooperation and
cooperation regimes are reported in table 2. This table shows that under the fully
economic environment, the command and the cooperative with side payments outcomes
giv e a total discounted economic rent ofN$ 10.23 billon over the 25 year time horizon of
the modeL. To achIeve this, all the TAC should be taken by the wetfish trawler fleet (that
is, when fl = 1; see figure 1). Under this scenario, we see that protection of the matue
stock by reducing the freezer fleet catch to zero tums out to be bioeconomically sensible.
Following the sharng rule mentioned earlier, the wetfish and freezer fleets receive N$
7.18 and N$ 3.05 bilion dollars, respectively, in the cooperative with side payments
scenano.
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The Nash cooperative ''without'' side payments outcome brings in N$ 7.14 billion (when
ß=0.6, see figure 1), which is signficantly more than the N$ 5.13 bilion produced in the
noncooperative environment. Of the total, the wetfish fleet pulls in N$ 6.18 bilion (N$
4.63 bilion under noncooperation), and the freezer fleet brings in N$ 0.96 (N$ 0.50
bilion under noncooperation). In comparson to the command and cooperative scenaros,
the noncooperative outcome is very bad - it produces an economic rent which is only
about 50% ofwhat is achievable under the command scenaro.
Payoffs in a east-less labour input setting
The motivation for implementing this scenaro comes from observations I made durng
my fieldwork: Key decision-makers in the MFMR were of the view that given the high
unemployment leve L in Namibia, the governent is more concerned with providing as
many sustainable jobs in the fishing sector of the economy as possible. I interpret this
point in this model to imply that the alternative cost of fishing labor inputs is taken to be
zero by the fisheries managers.
In figure 2, the discounted economic rent determined under the cooperative scenaro, for
different ß-values, are presented. In addition, table 2 reports the best results under
cooperation, command and noncooperative scenaros, respectively.
From this tab1e we see that the command outcome produces a payoff of N$ 13.27 bilion.
This happ ens when the wetfish fleet alone harest the stock, that is, when the preferences
of the wetfish fleet is given full weight by management (ß =1). A payoff of N$ 9.47
(wetfish: N$ 8.15 and freezer: N$ 1.32) bilion is realized under cooperation ''without''
side payments. Here, cooperation with side payments results in payoffs of N$ 9.56 and
N$ 3.71 bilion for wetfish and freezer trawlers, respectively. Finally, noncooperation
leads to a total payoff ofN$ 7.65 (wetfish: N$ 6.75 and freezer: N$ 0.90) bilion.
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The good outcomes achieved by the wetfish fleet relates to the fact that they enjoy a
number of "private" advantages. First, their landings receive, on average, higher price per
unit weight than those offreezer trawlers (see Sumaila, 1997b). Second, the proportion of
labor cost to total fishing cost is higher for the wetfish than the trawler fleet. Thus, in the
cost-Iess labor input scenaro, the performance of the wetfish fleet improves fuher.
Third, this class of fishing vessels appear to have an advantage in that they target juvenile
fish and can, therefore, undermine the freezer fleet in a competitive situation.
To find out the impact of the higher price received by the wetfish fleet, the model is re-
run under the assumption that landings by the wetfish fleet receive the same price per unit
weight as landings by the freezer fleet. Figure 3 displays graphically the discounted
economic rent achievable under cooperation in a fully economic setting. This graph
shows that in this case it is optimal to let only the freezer fleet to do the catching. From
table 2, we see that when both fleets face the same price, the command outcome give N$
7.52 bilion.
Standing biomass
Table 3 presents the average standing biomass and the harve st size and proportion, over
the 25 year time horizon of the mode!. A comparison of the numbers under the two
management scenaros reveal the following. One, the command or cooperative with side
payments scenario produces the best possible health for the stock under both assumptions
of the economic environment. Two, the noncooperative situation is terrble for the health
of the stock, producing average standing biomass which are well below those attained in
the command and cooperative with side payments scenaros. Three, the cooperative
without side payments scenario is second best, as it mitigates against the biological waste
shown to exist in the noncooperative scenario, but falls short of the optzmum optzmorum
achievable under cooperation with side payments or the command scenaro.
A comparson of the outcomes under the different assumptions of the economic
environment indicates that: Under the command and cooperative scenarios, the same
average standing biomass is achieved under the two economic environments. On the
other hand, under noncooperation because lower cost of fishing labor inputs implies a
14
greater "race" for the fish: lower cost pushes the equilibrium stock size lower. Hence, a
policy that tends to assume away the cost of fishing wil also tend to lower the average
standing stock size. The reader should note that qualitatively the "no price difference"
scenaro produces results that are similar to those discussed in the above paragraphs (see
tab le 3b).
Catch sizes and proportions
The average harest and the proportion of the catch in the base case (no price difference)
scenaro are reported in table 3a (table 3b). It is worth noting that the harest sizes for the
varous scenaros are good indicators ofboth the number ofboats and labor required to
land the harest. In fact, one may assurne a linear relationship between catch and these
input varables. Hence, we do not discuss separately the labor required to take the
landings predicted under the different scenaros.
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A number of observations can be made from tab le 3a (table 3b). First, in the fully
economic environment, an average hare st of 87,000 (80,000) tons is obtained under
noncooperation. The average harest under the command and cooperative without side
payments scenaros are 129,000 (79,000) and 85,000 (73,000) tons, respectively. Second,
the cost-Iess fishing labor input assumption results in higher harve st under all the
scenaros. However, the gains inharest under the noncooperative scenaro comes at a
biological cost - the average standing biomass is lower than in the fully economic
scenano.
The optimal catch proportion for the wetfish trawlers ranges between 95 - 100%, except
when the same price is assumed for the landings ofthe two vessel tyes. In which case a
catch proportion of zero for the wetfish fleet is found to be optimal under the command
and cooperative without side payments scenaros. These numbers are clearly different
from the current policy of 60-40% in favor of the wetfish fleet.
Discussion and concluding remarks
The study shows that the choice and implementation of management strategies for hake
can have huge effects on the bioeconomic benefits from the resource. To ilustrate this
point take the estimated average anual harests predicted by the study: a wide range of
between 73,000 to 141,000 tons depending on the management scenaro and the
assumptions underlying the economic environment. This calls for careful analysis on the
par of the MFMR to guide its decision making process. Clearly, with proper data, models
such as the one presented here can produce useful insights for practical management of
the hake fisheries of Namibia.
An important conclusion that can be deri ved from the results of this study is that a
management policy that seeks to protect either the juvenile or mature par of the stock
from exploitation produces good bioeconomic outcomes. This is because in all cases the
best outcomes are achieved either when only the wetfish or freezer trawlers are allowed to
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exploit the resource. This result is paricularly interesting because it may well be one
reason for the surrising dec1ine in the hake stock size after about 3 years of the
introduction of a policy of 60:40 division of the hake T AC between the wetfish and
freezer trawlers.
Another point to be made from the findings of the paper is that cooperation whether it
comes about through negotiations or enforced by a controller can lead to significant
economic gains to both pari es. Furhermore, the study shows that the need for good data,
both biological and socio-economic, cannot be over-emphasized. In addition, studies to
find out the selectivity pattems of the vessels us ed to exploit not only hake but other
important speeies in Namibian waters, would be very useful.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the study is, as with all modeling and computational
exercises, parial in some sense. For instance, the curent model does not explicitly
capture inter- and intra-species interaction. The next in the series of papers planned on the
hake fisheries of Namibia wil model canibalistic behavior by matue hake. This is
important because there is evidence to show that Namibian hake does exhibit this
behavior (Pitcher and Alheit, 1995).
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Notes
l The use of longliners to exploit hake is expected to increase with time, producing
impacts on both the biology and economics ofhake exploitation. In a counterpar paper,
the model presented here is extended to analyse the bioeconomic effects of introducing
this vessel tye as a major paricipant in the fishery.
2 Note that the catchability ofa fishing gear is defined as the share ofthe total stock being
caught by one unit of fishing effort. On the other hand, the selectivity parameter of a
fishing gear is the probability ofthe gear to hit fish of a paricular age group.
3 Clearly, this is one ofthe assumptions in the curent model that needs to be researched
and improved upon in future applications ofthe mode!.
4 The rule consist oftwo steps. First, each player must receive hIs threat point payoffs.
Second, the surlus over the sum of the threat point payoffs of all players is split equally
between the players. The rational for this sharng formula is that, to satisfy the individual
rationality constraint (Binmore, 1982), players must be guaranteed their p ayo ff under a
noncooperative regime, after whIch the surlus should be shared equally because each
par to the cooperative agreement contributed equally to its success.
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